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They are the final names on the Vietnam wall. The final casualties of US involvement in
South East Asia.
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On May 12, 1975 -- less than two weeks following the United
States evacuation of Vietnam, the SS Mayaguez a cargo ship, was steaming off
the coast of Cambodia when it was fired upon - boarded - and seized by
Cambodian Communist forces – the Khmer Rouge.
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1.
President Ford
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I felt that it was a violation of
international law, and that we as a government had an obligation to get the
crew and the ship back.
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Three days later, on May 15th American forces were
poised to launch a massive attack on a small island called Koh Tang. What they didn’t know was that they were
about to invade the wrong island.
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The battle for Koh Tang is part of an international incident
known as the Mayaguez Crisis. The
following story is told by the people who there and contains never before
seen secret footage and radio communications of the actual events.
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In the
Spring of 1975, The SS Mayaguez a 500-foot - merchant ship of US registry
routinely sails the volatile, war-torn waters off the coast of Vietnam and
Cambodia.
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12 May 1975
Gulf of Thailand
2:40 PM
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2.
Ray Friedler
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On this particular trip we left from Hong
Kong and were headed to Sattahip Thailand.
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3.
Tom LeBue
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I was on wheel watch steering the ship
when we received a shot across our bow.
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4.
Jerry Myregard
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I felt the vibration of the ship stop, so
I went outside to see what the problem was.
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On the bridge Captain Charles Miller scribbles a hasty entry
into the ships log …” May 12, 1975…1420
hours reduced to maneuvering speed, vessel challenged by gunboat and gunboat
fires shots across starboard bow. 1421 Engines stop 1425 gunboat P128 comes
along side”
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5.
Jerry Myregard
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When I got outside I saw these Khmer Rouge
soldiers coming aboard with black pajamas, bandoleers, automatic, weapons,
rocket launchers and I knew just what was happening.
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12 May 1975
Washington DC
7:30 AM
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6.
President Ford
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I was awakened on the morning of the 12th
of May by Brent Scowcroft who said there were radio indications that an
American merchant ship, the Mayaguez, had been seized in international
waters.
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7.
Brent Scowcroft
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I called both the CIA and then I called
Henry Kissinger and he had heard the same report. So we mobilized and by
10:00 that morning we had a NSC meeting.
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The White House
quickly issues a statement that the failure to release the crew will have the
“most serious consequences.”
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8.
James Schlesinger
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The
reaction was we had to do something and had to do something dramatic.
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9.
Henry Kissinger
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Having
just evacuated Indochina we could not graduate to the point where American
ships could be captured on the high seas
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During
the meeting Director of the CIA William Colby briefs the National Security
Council. Colby informs the president
that the Mayaguez is being forced into the Cambodian harbor of Kompong Som
and will be making port within the hour.
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10.
Henry Kissinger
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The imminence of these American hostages
arriving in Cambodia was something that provided a greater urgency to our
decisions
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The president puts US forces in the Western Pacific on alert
and orders a naval task force led by the aircraft carrier Coral Sea to
proceed immediately to the Gulf of Thailand.
Ford also orders the pentagon to conduct round the clock surveillance
of Mayaguez. In this never before
seen secret surveillance footage, the Mayaguez can be seen surrounded by
Cambodian gunboats. She’s is located
on the evening of May 12th not in the port Kompong Som where the CIA
reported, but at anchor off a small island in the Gulf of Thailand called Koh
Tang.
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Very
little is known about Koh Tang. It is
a three-mile by two-mile island covered with dense jungle -- about 35 miles
off the western coast of the Cambodian port of Kompong Som. The chance that
the Americans had been taken off the ship and put on Koh Tang is
encouraging. A rescue would be nearly
impossible if the Mayaguez crew were taken to the Cambodian mainland.
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Henry Kissinger
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Everybody especially President Ford who
was in the congress at the time remembered the Pueblo incident where the
North Koreans captured an American ship and sort of humiliated the United
States by not releasing the prisoners.
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But the fear in the White House goes well beyond the political
implications of the Mayaguez.
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11. Amb.
Quinn
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The thing to keep in mind about
the Khmer Rouge is they’re probably one of the three or four most brutal
genocidal regimes the world has ever seen.
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12. Amb. Quinn
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They ended up killing about two million
out of seven million in the country in about four years
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13. Henry
Kissinger
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to leave the Americans in the
hands of the Khmer Rouge was something we would not accept
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On the diplomatic front, Ford is faced with a difficult
situation -- How to negotiate with a country the US does not officially
recognize.
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The
Mayaguez crisis is becoming an exclamation point on one of the darkest
chapters in US Foreign policy.
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14.
Ambassador Quinn
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April 12th, 1975, the American Embassy in
Phnom Penh is evacuated. Five days later, //, the Khmer Rouge march into
Phnom Penh and evacuate the city. A million people taken, marched out into
forced, new living arrangements in the countryside. Two weeks later, April
25th, Saigon, the American Embassy evacuation begins.
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15.
President Ford
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We the United States had been literally
kicked out of Saigon by the North Vietnamese
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The void left in South East Asian diplomatic channels leaves
Ford few options.
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16.
President Ford
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The
best avenue to get our message to the Cambodians was through their friend,
their ally the People’s Republic of China
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The
message is simple can the Chinese contact the Khmer Rouge.
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17.
Henry Kissinger
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The Chinese in Washington refused to
accept the communication
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On the morning of May 13th the CIA confirms
Mayaguez is at anchor off Koh Tang.
US aircraft observe Cambodian boats making trips between the ship and
the island. Since none have gone to
the mainland, the CIA concludes the Americans have been put onto Koh Tang.
What they don’t know is the entire crew is being held on a fishing boat in
the cove just east of the island.
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18.
Brent Scowcroft
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We established a barrier, and air barrier
between Koh Tang island and the mainland to prevent the crew from being taken
to the mainland.
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On the evening of May 13th Ford assembles the third
meeting of the National Security Council. The news is not good. In Thailand a helicopter transporting Air
Force security personnel for an anticipated military operation has crashed
killing all 23 Americans onboard. This
picture was taken moments before take off.
The crisis has claimed its first American casualties. As Ford ponders
the tragedy an urgent message is received from a pilot flying over the
Mayaguez. Several boats are leaving
Koh Tang and heading in the direction of the Cambodian mainland. The radio message is patched directly to
the National Security Council meeting.
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19.
Brent Scowcroft
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One of the pilots of the aircraft called
in and said, "I have a boat here going to the mainland that looks like
there are Caucasians on board, my orders are to stop it or sink it, what
shall I do. "
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20.
Raymond Friedler
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They did everything they could to stop us
– to try keep the vessel from going to the main port.
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21.
Tom LeBue
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On the way to Kompong Som we were buzzed
by American planes and they dropped tear gas in the water.
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22.
Raymond Friedler
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They shot the gun boats that were leading
us, they shot those out of the water right away there was two that turned
around and went on either side of us and as I turned around I could see them
blowing them out of the water so there was only us left.
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23.
Brent Scowcroft
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I actually talked to the pilot and told
him not to sink that particular vessel and it turned out to be one with at
least part of the crew on board.
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US planes track the boat to within sight of the mainland but
are forced to turn back as they approach Cambodian airspace.
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24.
Raymond Friedler
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We ended up in the port of Kompong
Som where many people came down
wearing black pajamas and the all had guns.
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25.
Jerry Myregard
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We thought we were going to be paraded
through the streets. That was actually the low point in the whole episode for
us.
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But to the relief of the crew, and undetected by US
intelligence… they are not taken off at Kompong Som, but moved again to the
nearby island of Rong Som Lem.
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On the Morning of May 14th Ford calls the fourth and final meeting
of the National Security council. The
CIA reports that the boat, which made it to the Cambodian mainland, carried
only part of the crew. And they have
been taken into the countryside but no one knows where. They now believe the crew has been separated
into three groups one on the mainland, one on Koh Tang, and one remaining
aboard the Mayaguez. All three are
wrong.
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26.
Henry Kissinger
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Almost all the CIA
briefings turned out to be inaccurate.
Now my problem with that was not that they were inaccurate. But what was troublesome was the assurance
of which they presented it, which always was wrong.
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Faulty intelligence has turned the crisis into a virtual shell
game. Out of options Ford plays his
final card.
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27.
President Ford
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I ordered the Pentagon to take whatever
action was required necessary to recapture the ship and to save the crew.
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28.
James Schlesinger
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The diplomatic maneuvers at
that point were secondary. We
believed quite clearly that only a display of force was going to bring the
Cambodians to yield.
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Ford sets a 24- hour deadline. If the crew is not released by the morning of May 15th,
contingents of the Navy, Air Force and Marines will conduct operation
“Rescue”. Just after dawn two marine
assault forces will simultaneously seize Koh Tang and the SS Mayaguez at
anchor just North of the island. Navy and Air Force aircraft will support the
operation as well as bomb-selected targets on the Cambodian Mainland.
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14 May 1975
U Tapao Airfield
Thailand
7:00 PM
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By the evening of the 14th US forces are massing for the
assault. A marine amphibious brigade
is air lifted from Okinawa to U Tapao Thailand. As they arrive the Marine Commander assigned to assault Koh
Tang Lt. Col. Randall Austin finds that he lacks even the most basic
intelligence concerning his objective.
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29.
Austin
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There were no maps there were no photos
there was none of the normal kinds of basic information you would expect
about an objective area.
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30.
Capt James Davis
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so I offered my 35mm camera. I asked to send a staff sergeant to the PX
to buy some film. With that//we, got
aboard a Cessna twin and we headed for the island, which was around 190 miles
from U Tapao.
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31.
Col Austin
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We were taking photos out the window with
a hand held camera at 4500 feet Its not the optimal in terms of gathering
intelligence.
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32.
Capt James Davis
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I was disappointed with the detail of the
photographs. I did however see two small beaches. And with that being the
only advantage I saw in the photograph, and in the tactical situation I knew
I would have to land helicopters on two beaches simultaneously.
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The beaches Davis saw are on opposite sides of the Northern
neck of Koh Tang. The island’s rocky terrain and dense jungle make landing
anywhere else virtually impossible. The marines are told that the majority of
the Americans are held on Koh Tang in a compound located directly between the
two beaches. They are also told a
skeleton crew is still being held aboard the Mayaguez.
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33.
Lt. James McDaniel
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About midnight we started breaking out the
ammunition. That was a unique
experience.
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34.
Lt. Michael Cicere
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One of the first things that impact you on
a situation like that if this is the real thing is when we started handing
out grenades.
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What the Marines don’t know is that the critical intelligence
they need arrives only seconds before Capt. Davis boards his helicopter.
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35.
Capt James Davis
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a Staff Sergeant walked up to me and he
said, “ Captain, here are your aerial photos. “ These obviously were photos taken by, I assume, a U2, or any
other sophisticated air platform.
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36.
GSGT Lester McNemar
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It showed barracks, it
showed – looked like AA positions - round, heavily fortified AA positions.
You seen some bunkers and trenches.
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37.
Capt. James Davis
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Within minutes, if not seconds, one of the
pilots said, “ Saddle up, we’re going in! “ At that point and time, I looked
over at Gunnery Sgt. McNemar, and I said, “ Gunny, I ‘m not even going to
show these photos to the troops. We don’t have time. But I think we’re in for a world of
trouble.”
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At 4:15 AM on May 15th 1975, eleven Air Force
helicopters carrying the two assault forces leave U Tapao, Thailand. Three choppers will drop a contingent of 1st
Battalion 4th Marines on the USS Harold E. Holt for a ship-to-ship
assault of the Mayaguez. The eight
remaining helicopters head straight for Koh Tang.
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38.
Michael Cicere
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The marines were quiet; they were
obviously very tense when I gave them their briefing. I tried to calm them as much as I possible
could, although, you know, I was acting myself, because I was as scared as
anybody else not knowing what we are going to run into.
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As flight operations begin on the USS Coral Sea, US
intelligence picks up a radio broadcast from inside Cambodia.
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39.
Henry Kissinger
40.
President Ford
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The
Cambodians issued a statement, which strongly implied that the hostages would
be released. But they issued that on
the open radio, they did not communicate it to us, through a government, or
through any other means that they might have available.
We had to have some
definitive answer from the Cambodian government otherwise I had no choice
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While the speech is being translated, Khmer authorities on the
island of Rong Sam Lem – some 35 miles from Koh Tang release the crew of the
Mayaguez placing them back on the fishing boat.
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41.
Raymond Friedler
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We were being escorted by a Khmer Rouge PT
boat, finally they waved at us peeled off and we realized that we were being
released.
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Nearly three hours will pass before anyone knows the Americans
have been freed.
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15 May 1975
Just North of Koh Tang
6:10 AM
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As the USS Holt steams toward the Mayaguez lookouts spot Khmer
guards on her deck armed with AK-47s.
In preparation for the assault, Naval aircraft drop tear gas on the
Mayaguez. Seconds later the destroyer
pulls along side and the Marines storm over the ship’s rail. Moving deck to deck the Marines take the
ship without firing a shot. Mayaguez
is empty. In the ships galley a pot
of warm rice and some tea are testament to the haste in which the Cambodian
guards have fled.
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As the fishing boat carrying the freed American’s makes its
way toward the Mayaguez the Marines approach Koh Tang.
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The plan for the siege is simple. The Eastern zone is nearest to the Cambodian compound where the
Marines still believe some of the crew is held. With units landing on the East beach and across the island on
the West Beach the Marines plan to encircle the Cambodians.
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42.
Lt James McDaniel
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Over the radio, I could
hear that they had identified some enemy patrol boats below us that started
to shoot up.
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43.
Capt. Davis
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I looked down and I saw
an orange glow below the helicopter. I had no idea what our altitude was or
where our position was in relation to the island. But the orange glow, I knew
it was ground fire
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Although
the helicopters are well out of reach of the Cambodian fire. Their approach to Koh Tang is no longer a
secret.
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44.
Rot Lang
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We could hear the aircraft as they flew in
from the Gulf. We contacted the
commanders of regiments and battalions and told them that the situation was
not good and that we heard the sound of many planes. The commanders ordered that all protecting
forces around the island to prepare for war.
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45. Mao Run
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Having just
liberated Phnom Penh our forces were fresh and new. They had not forgotten their fighting tactics…they were all
well prepared and had not lost their courageous spirit.
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15 May 1975
Koh Tang
West Beach Landing
6:15 AM
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46.
Lt. James McDaniel
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The sun was just starting to creep over
the horizon and it’s very dramatic. It’s black and then all of a sudden
there’s just some faint sunlight and then all of a sudden the sun comes up
and everything is blazing in light.
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Coming in low across the water the first two choppers approach
the Western zone. As they attempt to
land the tree line erupts in a barrage of automatic weapons fire.
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47.
Lt. James McDaniel
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You could see a bullet puncture the side
of the helicopter. And it seemed like it was in slow motion as it would come
through the skin of the helicopter
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As McDaniel’s Platoon exits the aircraft, they become the targets.
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48.
Lt James McDaniel
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Staff Sergeant Salinas
led the charge off of the helicopter and as he walked off onto the rocks. I
could see bullets bouncing off the rocks to either side of him
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Sitting on the beach McDaniel’s helicopter takes punishing
hits. Having lost an engine the pilot nurses the chopper out over the water.
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49.
GSGT Lester McNemar
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I see the first helicopter in the western zone
going out about 500 to 600 yards out into the ocean to the north end of the
island, get down in the water, sat there for like 2 seconds, flipped over and
sank.
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The helicopter carrying Gunnery Sergeant McNemar and Capt.
Davis – then circles back and attempts to insert its Marines.
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50.
Capt. James Davis
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I was hit with something in the face and
it turned me a flip. I looked to my left, and the crew chief/ gunner on the
gun had been hit also.
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Heavy machine gun fire rakes down the length of the chopper.
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51.
Capt. Davis
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The chopper was badly damaged, there was
hydraulic fluid, and you could smell fuel
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52.
Gunny McNemar
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The pilot decided to abort and head to the
mainland, back to Thailand or U Tapao, we didn’t know where we were going.
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Across the island the welcome for the Choppers on the East
beach is even worse.
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May 15 1975
Koh Tang
East Beach Landing
6:21 AM
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53.
Maj. Al Corson
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We were doing a high-speed ingress, which
is the way you want to go in to minimize your exposure time.
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54.
Moa Run
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4 or 5 helicopters approached the island.
They were not shooting, but we knew we were in a state of war since they
already bombed our boats.
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55.
Lt. Cicere
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I
stood up and looked out the right door to assess what was happening and as we
started to make our approach I could see over to the other side of the island
So I started thinking to myself maybe this is not maybe going along to the plan.
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56.
JD Harston
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As we approached and started the
transition from our forward flight as it into a side maneuver we started
taking ground fire Randy opened up fro the left side and Rich Vandegeer
punched his m16 out the side window vent
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57.
Terry Tonkin
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Just as we started to make our turn to the
beach, I started to the aft ramp of the aircraft, to exit when we
landed. And as I was about half way
through the aircraft, there was a loud noise And obviously we’ve been hit.
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58.
Mike Cicere
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I heard an explosion and I looked out the
door to the left and I could see knife 3-1 completely engulfed in flames at
that point and the helicopter just spinning madly around
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59.
Maj. Corson
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I lost control
completely of the helicopter. We completed part of the turn then we impacted
the water.
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60.
Terry Tonkin
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I really don’t remember anything between
that loud explosion and a few moments later when I wake up or became
conscious, in about a foot of water with the aircraft just to my right,
burning furiously.
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Lt. Tonkin and several crewmembers are blown out of the
aircraft by the force of the explosion.
With the fire spreading many are still trapped inside.
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61.
JD Harston
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The marines were in quite a bit disarray
in the back trying to get out the helicopter
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62.
Terry Tonkin
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See Marines trying to push through the
Plexiglas windows on the side of the aircraft
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63.
JD Harston
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I yelled at a bunch of them to follow me
out from underneath the right gun there at the doorway
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64.
Terry Tonkin
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I heard one of the air force crew chiefs
to my side and he already had a survival radio out and was calling a mayday,
mayday,
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65.
JD Harston
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The pilot was still in there. And really with all the shock and every
thing, Al Corson was still trying to fly the helicopter.
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66.
Maj. Corson
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The next thing I remember is Sergeant
Harston coming to my side window in the helicopter.
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67.
JD Harston
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I yelled at him to get out and he
literally undid himself, stepped out over the rotor pedals right into the
water. There was just absolutely no
front on the helicopter. The co-pilot Rich Vandegeer was slumped over in his
harnesses
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68.
Maj. Corson
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When I looked at Lt Vandegeer he was
hanging in his harness… he was hanging in his harness just forward his head
down hanging over the control stick and he was obviously dead and shortly
there after he caught on fire.
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Trailing just behind the greeting for the second
helicopter into the Eastern zone is every bit as fierce.
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A
direct hit completely severs the helicopters tail section.
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69.
Moa Run
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We shot down two of the helicopters, one
caught fire and fell into the water and the other fell along the beach.
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70.
Lt. Cicere
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Once we hit the deck people collected
themselves and made and immediately b-lined out of that helicopter and into
the tree line.
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Lt. Cicere and 3rd Platoon are pined down and cut
off. Only minutes into the landing,
four of the eight helicopters are damaged or destroyed and 14 Marines and Air
force crewmen lay dead.
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71.
Lt. Cicere
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With one helicopter burning out in the
water just to the south of us and the carcass of what is left of our
helicopter sitting fouling the landing zone it became apparent very quickly
that no one else was going to land in there…
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Now the focus of the Khmer Rouge guns shifts to the survivors
in the water.
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72.
Maj. Corson
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From the time we exited we were all under
small arms fire and automatic weapons fire. The only option that we had was
to try to get away from that ground fire which meant going out.
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73.
JD Harston
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Everyone else took their helmets off – and
I didn’t, and I do not know why I didn’t I just didn’t and I was swimming,
facing the Island dog paddling backwards, with these guys, the two marines
actually hanging onto my shoulders on my back. And a round smack me right between the eyes about an inch above
where the helmet comes right across, and drove me back into the water, and it
was the guys who I had pulled that now pulled me out because they had to drag
me out from where it drove me back in the water, and it split my helmet right
in two.
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Koh Tang
West Beach
8:40 AM
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After making repeated attempts to land the helicopter carrying
the command unit with Lt. Col. Randall Austin is forced to unload nearly a
mile South of the West beach.
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By 10:00 o’clock the Marines find themselves divided into
three groups, separated by dense jungle and rugged terrain. With the command
unit isolated the leadership of the main assault force falls into the hands
two 2nd Lieutenants -- with no combat experience.
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74. Lt. McDaniel
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Col.
Austin comes over the radio and wants a group of marines come down and linkup
with his position.
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75. Col. Austin
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We were not what you would call a potent fighting force, not the kind
of group that you want to be isolated with in a situation like that.
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76. Lt. McDaniel
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He was the
command group and they only had 4 rifles among their group.
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Lt. McDaniel selects 14 Marines and
heads South to link up with Austin.
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77. Lt. McDaniel
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All of a sudden
there were 3 or 4 hand grenades that went off in the middle of us. My
squad leader Lance Corporal Loney was immediately killed.
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78. Rot Leng
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We opened fire
with our rifles against the troops. During the attack the leader of the
American troops was wounded.
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There was
another marine that was directly in front of me and then there was another
marine that was directly behind me. Both those two marines were severely
wounded.
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79. Rot Leng
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We had plenty of ammunition and strength and our forces attacked
fiercely
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80. Lt. McDaniel
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We stop trying
to fire back at them because every time we do there is this thick counter
fire from them. Things are quiet for
a second and out folks, some of our folks are very upset to the point of
being hysterical some of them start crying out for God, for Jesus to come and
help. It was a very intense moment and the enemy was all around us and they
could here us. They could not understand English but they could understand
the emotion that was being expressed in our voices. They started laughing and
it was a very eerie feeling because they were taking pleasure in hearing the
emotion in our voices.
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As McDanial’s platoon is fighting for their lives, across the
island search and rescue Helicopters are attempting recovery of the Marines
on the East beach.
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East Beach
Koh Tang
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81.
Lt. Cicere
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All of a sudden this helicopter shows up
When they came in, it was really a big surprise. They got down on the
deck. And when they did, right even
when they were coming in, it was like the fourth of July.
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Engulfed in flames the helicopter is forced to abort the
rescue attempt.
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In the water below the survivors of Major Corson’s helicopter
have been swimming for more than three hours.
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82.
JD Harston
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I thought the helicopters were going to
come back around and pick us up right quick but apparently when they saw us
go down, they didn’t think there would be any survivors from the crash so
they didn’t even make an attempt.
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83.
Lt. Tonkin
|
After three hours or so we were getting
tire-der, and tired-er and just using whatever energy we could to keep trying
to move away from the island.
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West Beach
10:30 AM
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84.
Lt. McDaniel
|
Time started to tick by and then I realized
that I had these hand grenades in my pockets I couldn’t fire back with my
rifle but I could at least throw these hand grenades back at them
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The volley of grenades momentarily silences the Cambodian guns
and Lt. McDaniel make his withdrawal.
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The Marines work their way out of the killing zone and back to
their lines.
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85.
Col. Austin
|
At that point we realized that probably
wasn’t feasibly for them to push the perimeter very much towards us and we
had, in fact, to move towards them.
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East Beach
10:45 AM
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Nearly four hours after the crash of the helicopters on the
East beach, Major Corson, Lt. Tonkin, Sgt. Harston and the remaining
survivors (many wounded and severely burned) are pulled out of the water and
taken to the USS Wilson.
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The second wave including Capt. Davis who would be making his
second attempt to land on Koh Tang takes off just before 10:00 AM. While in
route the marines get a message that triggers mixed emotions.
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At 11:55 AM the fishing boat released by the Khmer Rouge on
the island of Rong Sam Leng approaches the USS Wilson waving a white flag.
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86.
Jerry Myregard
|
The Wilson trained it gun on us and we
realized that perhaps we could be shot.
So we waved our arms took our shirts off and made it known that we
were Americans. We got along side and we climbed aboard and I met a naval
officer who informed me that there were a few marines that had been shot;
They had 'em on ice as he called it. On the Wilson
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The crew of the Mayaguez -- 40 Americans thought to be held on
Koh Tang are safe.
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In Washington the president and his chief advisors breathe a
sigh of relief.
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87.
President Ford
|
After three or four days of very tense
circumstances I felt very relieved.
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88.
Brent Scowcroft
|
And so, our attention turned to "How
do we get the Marines off Koh Tang Island?" That turned into a very difficult, very difficult operation
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89.
Lt. Cicere
|
We were not going to plant a flag here,
like Iwo Jima, and claim it for the United States. That really wasn’t the reason for us being there. If the crew’s been picked up, now the next
step become how we going to get ourselves extracted out of this, out of this
situation.
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The marines on Koh Tang are still encountering heavy
resistance and Lt. Cicere’s 3rd platoon is isolated and extremely
vulnerable. Without reinforcements
the Marines run the risk of becoming prisoners of the Khmer Rouge
themselves. Having linked up with the
main force, Col. Austin inquires on the status of the second wave.
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90.
Col. Austin
|
Several times, I was communicating with
the airborne command and control center and asking what was the state of the
second wave and in one of those later inquiries was told, they had been
turned back and I was somewhat dismayed by that response and asked that be
reconsidered, that second wave, ah…be sent to the island
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Austin’s message makes its’ point. The second wave is cleared to go but they are still more than
an hour from Koh Tang.
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TRANSITION “The Second Wave”
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In a scene eerily reminiscent of the morning raid, the first
helicopter of the second wave approaches the eastern landing zone.
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91.
Lt. Cicere
|
You don’t have to be Daniel Boone to it a
helicopter especially at 53. And they
waited for the opportune time to put the maximum damage on those helicopters
and on anybody that happened to be inside.
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The severely damaged helicopter (and her much needed
reinforcements) heads directly for the Thai coast.
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The remaining choppers in the second wave unload Captain Davis
and 100 Marines into the Western zone.
Even with the reinforcements, poor communications and heavy resistance
make it impossible for the Marines to link up with Lt. Cicere. The only option is to get 3rd
platoon out.
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The Second Wave
Koh Tang
1:00 PM
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Circling
just off the beach search and rescue helicopters make one last attempt to extract
3rd platoon.
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92.
Harry Cash
|
Well we decided it was time, time to make
a move. My pilot Don Backland said I think this is going to be the last train
out of Dodge City
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At 5:50 PM Lt. Cicere sees the helicopter coming in for the
extraction.
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93.
Lt. Cicere
|
If I can see the helicopter coming in, so
can the bad guys. So I knew we were going to be in for an interesting, a few
moments, when the helicopter came in.
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94.
Harry Cash
|
About maybe 200-meters out then they
opened up. I could just hear the bullets just hitting the front of the
helicopter
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With Navy and Air Force planes providing cover 3rd platoon
fights its way off the beach and into the waiting chopper.
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95.
Lt. Cicere
|
He is hovering that helicopter, and the
helicopter would drop down, give within about five feet of the deck and then
it would go up, so you, what we ended up having to do was people were getting
aboard was time their jump if you will to get on to the to get on to the ramp
and get aboard the helicopter.
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Twelve hours after the Marines landed on Koh Tang the rescue
helicopter carrying 3rd platoon takes off from the East
beach. During the evacuation the
chopper sustains so much that it would be unable to fly again.
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96.
Harry Cash
|
I
just knew that we had to get those people out. That if we didn’t do it, I
didn’t think it’d be done.
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97.
Lt. Cicere
|
There's just no way to describe, I don’t
think, how elated that you are that you realized you survived something, that
could have very easily gone the other way. Especially when I think you saw
right before you people in a similar situation that, unfortunately, were not
as lucky as you were.
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The rescue of the Rescuers
Koh Tang
6:30 PM
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With nightfall quickly approaching the airborne command and
control puts the question to the Marines on the beach. Can the evacuation be done under cover of
darkness?
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98.
Col. Austin
|
My response to that was yes, I think we can do it under
darkness, but I’m going to lay down one proviso, here and that is that once
we start we must have the commitment to finish this
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99.
Capt. Davis
|
Col. Austin came up to me and said Jim how
do you want to pull this I said the best thing for me to do is get this down
to one commander.
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100.
Austin
|
As the company commander, he would be left
eventually with a small force and that he was going to close the beach and be
amongst the last ones out.
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101.
Davis
|
As you incrementally reduce a perimeter
especially under fire in the dusk you run the risk of losing people and also
losing the element of security.
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|
As the helicopters attempt to coordinate the withdrawal, they
receive a message that a wounded marine may have been left in one of the
downed helios on the East beach.
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The
damage to Jolly Green 12 leaves only three helicopters to evacuate the more
than 200 marines still on Koh Tang.
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102. Bruce
Daly
|
The reports we were getting when we were
making our run in that the marines were being pushed back form the tree line
to the beach, to the water even and it was going to be real tight getting in
there.
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As the sun sets over the Gulf of Thailand the evacuation of
the marines goes into full swing.
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To cover the evacuation the Air Force drops the largest
non-nuclear weapon in the US arsenal a 15,000- pound bomb on the center of
the island behind the enemy positions.
The explosion rocks the island to its core.
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103.
Davis
|
We could see the parachute deploy we could
see the palette that was below it and I can remember saying gunny I think
they are going to re-supply us and Within seconds the jungle seemed to
explode and we figured out what it was
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Shortly
before 7:00 PM the EVAC choppers approach Koh Tang.
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104.
Daly
|
When helicopters are
making their run in, you can hear how bad they got beat; sometimes you can
hear ‘we are taking ground fire, taking ground fire’ and stuff like
that. And you sit back and take a
deep breath and wait your turn.
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With the departure of each load of marines the forces still on
the ground become more vulnerable.
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105.
Davis
|
As the perimeter was incrementally reduced
and echo company passed through my lines.
I did ask the company commander, I said “Mike do you have all of your
people?” and he said yes, “get on the choppers!”
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106.
McNemar
|
I went in hot on the lines check and
making sure all my people got back and went on across the open space to the
south side of the western zone and was checking Echo company if any of Echo
company marines were over there make sure that everybody had pulled back
correctly.
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Every
time the perimeter is reduced Khmer Rouge forces fill in the gaps, pushing
the marines closer to the sea.
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107.
McDaniel
|
We’d here the underbrush slowly crumble as
the enemy slowly crawled forward trying to come as close to our position as
possible.
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108.
McNemar
|
A
Khmer Rouge took a shot at me and it went right past my flack jacket and I
dropped him with two shots. The second one turned and I got him he fell down
into the gully that was the last I seen of him.
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109.
Davis
|
I picked up the radio to try to
communicate and I communicated with a foreigner. Somebody had picked up one of those prick 77 radios and it
wasn’t a friendly.
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With the last 29 marines clinging to a sliver of beach Capt.
Davis faces the most harrowing moments of the operation.
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110.
Davis
|
At
the last perimeter our boots were literately almost in the water.
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|
As the choppers make their way back to Koh Tang radio contact
is lost with the Marines on the beach.
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111.
McNemar
|
We were trying to figure out wait a second
do they know we are still here how are we going to get off.
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112.
Davis
|
That’s probably the longest time of my
life. When your boots are wet and your elbows are in beach sand, there’s not
a lot – you don’t own a lot of real estate. And there are not a lot of
alternatives at that point in time except fighting to the death or swimming.
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Shortly after 8:00 PM on May 15, 1975 – 15 hours after the
first Marines had fought their way onto Koh Tang the final helicopter touches
down on the beach.
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113.
Davis
|
We boarded the helicopter then I remember
Tech Sergeant Fisk jumping out of the helicopter one more time with the ramp
down and checking, making a hasty check of the right side and then as he got
back on the ramp of the chopper the chopper took off.
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114.
McNamar
|
Fisk slips and the only thing I can grab
is the cord to his microphone on his helmet.
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115.
Davis
|
His eyes were getting bigger and bigger as
he was sliding out the back of that helicopter.
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116.
McNemar
|
I reached down and got his sleeve or his
arm. I grabbed something and I yanked him up.
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117.
Davis
|
It through his body into my lap and we
gave each other a big hug and that was it. The day was over.
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118.
Rot Lang
|
We finally won and took back the island.
We gathered the bodies of the American soldiers and put them all
together. We concluded that we had
achieved victory.
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|
Minutes later, word reaches the White House. The Marines have been evacuated from Koh
Tang.
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But the relief is short lived.
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119.
Austin
|
Within minutes of the extraction - we’re
taking a head count and making sure, trying to determine who we have –
certainly expecting that we’re going to have everybody.
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120.
Davis
|
Colonel Austin walked up to me
and asked, “Jim to the best of your knowledge did you get all the marines off
of that beach?” I said, “Yes sir.”
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121.
McNemar
|
Echo Company had three marines missing.
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|
|
Lance Corporal Joseph Hargrove, Private First Class Gary Hall
and Private Danny Marshall were last seen shortly before the final load of
Marines withdrew from Koh Tang.
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122.
Davis
|
It seams that if they would have been
alive they would have come back and joined us, number 1. Number 2, Why didn’t
they call out for help?
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123.
Austin
|
We, I think, came to the correct and the
only logical decision that these three marines had been killed in the
extensive exchange of fire that occurred as the helicopters came in for the
extraction.
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|
The final report concludes that Hall, Hargrove and Marshall
were killed in action.
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124.
Rot Lang
|
As a medical person I was the
one that gathered all of the dead bodies and provided bandages for the
wounded Khmers and American soldiers Injured Khmer soldiers were sent to the
mainland, whereas the injured American soldiers were not. They later died on the battlefield. In the days following the attack 4 or 5
American soldiers came out of the forest.
They came out because they did not have water to drink. The island’s
water is salt water. The island
protecting forces caught them and questioned them, and then they were sent to
battalion headquarters. The battalion
began the process of questioning.
They were not tortured or hurt.
Since at that time the Khmer did not speak the American Language they
were sent to the mainland to people who could translate.
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125.
Davis
|
It is the worse scenario that
goes through my mind every day.
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126.
McNemar
|
its bad enough that I left the
island and had marines that were KIA, I left marine bodies back there which I
don’t like to do. To think that those marines were alive – I would have gone
back in myself.
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127.
Davis
|
If there were marines on that island if
there were any question as to whether or not they were dead or alive //we
would have had to die there and we know that
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|
|
Including the crash of the Air Force Helicopter in Thailand
the cost of the Mayaguez operation is high: 41 US military personnel were
killed and fifty more were wounded.
The fact that the bodies of some US servicemen were not recovered from
the island left doubts and open wounds for years to come.
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|
|
Even worse was the revelation that the heavy resistance the
marines encountered on Koh Tang had nothing to do with the United States or
the seizure of the Mayaguez.
|
|
128.
Scowcroft
|
The Cambodians and the
Vietnamese were having a confrontation about who owned Koh Tang Island. And
the Cambodians had put troops on the island to assert their sovereignty. We
didn't know that.
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|
129.
Quinn
|
And as the American ship Mayaguez comes
along, the Khmer Rouge run out and seizes it, fearful that it is somehow some
part of some possible Vietnamese or American trick to begin to retake the
country.
|
|
|
Tragically the Mayaguez Crisis erupted in the wrong place at
the wrong time.
|
|
130.
Scowcroft
|
Was it in fact necessary, we don't know we
spotted important national interests at stake and we moved very quickly and
in ad hoc kind of way to protect those national interests, and it worked.
|
|
131. James
Schlesinger
|
It was only the question of force that led
the Cambodians to deliver up the hostages.
|
|
132.
President Ford
|
The only answer was the one that we took:
meet it head on.
|
|
133. Henry
Kissinger
|
And we achieved what we set out to
do. But when you looked at it as part
of a bigger scheme of things it was sort of a paltry objective we had entered
Indochina to save countries, and we wound up rescuing a ship.
|
|
|
Back on Koh Tang the reality of what the Marines faced in
1975, can still be seen. Fragments of
American helicopters, overgrown bunkers and trees scarred with bullet holes
are haunting reminders of the horrors of war. From fortified positions in the dense tree line Khmer Rouge
forces laid in wait to greet the marines with a force at least five times the
original estimates.
|
|
|
We may never know the truth about the missing Americans. Were they killed in action as the official
report states? Or are they part of
the dark secrets buried in the killing fields of Cambodia?
In the end, the Mayaguez Crisis is a mere footnote to the
controversial history of US involvement in Southeast Asia. In the end, a list of names lost amidst
all of the bad news that was the Vietnam War.
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